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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
nized by the Universal Military Training and Service Act, but that only one of
them is exempt from military service, the other being required to serve regard-
less of sincerity of belief.0 This being the case, the Superintendent should de-
termine whether petitioner's draft board felt him to be sincere in his belief. If,
in spite of his sincerity, he was unable to obtain exemption from military serv-
ice, the conviction for refusal to be inducted into the armed services would
not be considered sufficient evidence of untrustworthiness, within the pur-
view of section 119, to deny him an insurance broker's license.
It is apparent that the Court of Appeals had an eye on the recent United
States Supreme Court decision in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners1 0 In that
case the appellant was prohibited from taking the bar exam of New Mexico on
the ground that his use of several aliases, a number of arrests (but no convic-
tions) during labor disputes, and admitted membership in the Communist
Party during the 1930's, were conclusive evidence that he did not possess the
"good moral character" required by the state of its attorneys. The Supreme
Court held it to be a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to bar him because of such past conduct alone, saying, "In deter-
mining whether a person's character is good, the nature of the offense which
he has committed must be taken into account." " and "[mWere unorthodoxy
does not as a matter of fair and logical inference negative good moral character."12
The implication of Koster v. Holz,13 however, is quite a bit more narrow
than that of the Schware case.' 4 The Court of Appeals, perhaps looking to other
administrative determinations, limits the aim of its dicta to cases where tie
particular statute in question does not expressly provide that a conviction per se
is sufficient ground to bar an applicant under such statute. Nor does the de-
cision give any affirmative information as to what kind of crimes have a bear-
ing on the trustworthiness of an individual.
It is submitted that those convicted of serious crimes involving moral tur-
pitude will still fail to meet statutory requirements of trustworthiness of good
moral character. However, the doors may open to those who have been con-
victed of less serious crimes which are not related to the purpose of the partic-
ular statute. The precise dividing line remains to be determined.
Procedural Safeguards in Administrative Review
Dissatisfied with the results of a local school district election which ap-
9. Supra note 5.
10. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
11. Ibid. at 243.
12. Ibid. at 244.
13. Supra note 4.
14. Supra note 10.
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proved construction and authorized a bond issue to be paid out of future taxes,
the piitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Education to set aside the elec-
tion, alleging procedural irregularities. Acting under rules of the Department,
the Commissioner held a hearing at which affidavits, pleadings, and exhibits
were available, briefs exchanged, and oral arguments of counsel heard. Relying
on the presumption of regularity and che failure of the petitioner to prove any
irregularity, the Commissioner found that the suggestion that the election was
not accurate could be upheld only by engagement in pure speculation, and he
accordingly affirmed the results. Petitioner thereupon brought this Artide 78
proceeding for annulment of the Commissioner's determination and was re-
buffed in the lower courts where the Commissioner's decision was viewed as
not arbitrary in any sense. On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals rejected
jurisdiction, holding that no constitutional issue was involved within the pur-
view of §2037 of the Civil Practice Act.' 5
Where administrative functions involve the determination of personal and
property rights, a quasi-judicial type of determination, it is clear that procedures
used must accord with the due process clause of the Constitution, including the
right to notice, hearing, and opportunity to present testimony.1' Contrasted to
this are matters purely administrative in nature which are analogous to "man-
agement of private business"' 7 and not subject to due process limitations. The
petitioner here argued that he was deprived of his rights under due process
concepts by virtue of not having the opportunity to produce witnesses at the
hearing and cross-examine, relying heavily on Hecht v. Monaghan,'8 which
held that a cabby's hack license - a "property" right - could not be taken
away by administrative action without adherence to the due process normal to
a quasi-judicial hearing. The majority brushed this argument aside, however:
The principle underlying that decision is not applicable to an adminis-
trative determination of the sort here involved. The Hecht case, . .
dealt with the revocation of the petitioner's license to carry on his busi-
ness or occupation and necessarily affected his very right to make a liv-
ing.19
Thus, the implication seems dear that a local taxpayer does not have a
property interest as such when contesting school district action before the Com-
15. O'Brien v. Commissioner of Education, 4 N.Y.2d 140, 173 N.Y.S.2d 265(1958). Disputes concerning the validity of district meetings or elections are
reviewable by the Commissioner under §2037 of the Education Law. Also, see
§310 of the act which provides for appeals to the Commissioner generally and
seems to include the scope of §2037.
16. Hecht v. Monaghan. 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954).
17. O'Brien v. Commissioner of Education, supra note 15, Van Voorhis, J.,
concurring, at 146, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 268 (1958).
18. 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954).
19. O'Brien v. Commissioner of Education, supra note 15, at 145, 173
N.Y.S.2d at 267 (1958).
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missioner; personal rights or property rights are not involved which would
constitute the review a quasi-judicial act.
Judge Van Voorhis, concurring, disagreed with this conclusion, although
he favored dismissal since it did not appear on the record that the petitioner
had demanded before the Commissioner the rights contended for an appeal. In
his view, the petitioner had a property interest, the hearing was quasi-judicial
in nature, and there was a triable issue of fact which would require testimony
and the right to cross-examine. The cases he cites to support his premises that
due process applies, however, involved the seizure of property or the imposition
of a burden or public judgment upon a person or group by government20 and
not a contest of governmental power to act by individual taxpayers. Even though
taxpayers have been recognized as having an interest (sometimes referred to as
proprietary) which permits them to sue municipal corporations and local gov-
ernment units,2 1 it should not follow that they must necessarily be accorded all
the procedural forms associated with due process where specific property or
personal rights are being moved against by governmental agencies other than
through the medium of taxation which imposes a burden upon the community
at large equally.
State Pension Not Subject to Diminution of Payments by Change of Mortality
Tables
The Teachers Retirement System in New York consists in part of an an-
nuity which is paid to employees upon retirement from contributions made by
the members 22 The Education Law provides that the annuity "shall be the ac-
tuarial equivalent of his [the member's] accumulated contributions at the time
of his retirement."28
In 1935, the stability of this system was placed in considerable doubt by
the dictum in Roddy v. Valentine,24 to the effect that
[w]here the statutory scheme creates a fund wholly or largely out
of public moneys, the interest of the member down to the point where
there has been compliance with all precedent conditions and the award
has been or as of right should have been made, can hardly be deemed
contractual . . .. [W]hatever its legal nature may be, there seems to
20. Hecht v. Monaghan, supra note 16; New York Edison Co. v. Maltbie, 271
N.Y. 103, 2 N.E.2d 277 (1936); New York State Guernsey Breeders Co-op v.
Noyes, 284 N.Y. 197, 30 N.E.2d 471 (1940); Rochester Transit Corp. v. Public
Service Comm., 271 App. Div. 406, 66 N.Y.S.2d 593 (3d Dep't 1946).
21. See Bradford, Municipal Taxpayjers and Standing to Sue, 2 BUF. L.
REV. 140. Also see N. Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §51.
22. N. Y. EDUCATION LAw §501(12) and (14).
23. N. Y. EDUCATION LAw §510(2) (a).
24. 268 N.Y. 228, 231, 197 N.E. 260, 262 (1935).
